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In rising to respond to the request of your committee I desire
first of all to express my sense of our indebtedness to them for
their very instructive report. They have surveyed and mapped
out before us the present condition of American legal education.
For one, I have received from their report much light both upon
scope and upon methods of instruction. They have given us a
great store of information, and have added what I have found to
be very helpful comments on the facts they have given us.
The committee conclude that for the majority of American law
schools the required course cannot exceed two years; and they
recommend that some elective studies in higher jurisprudence be
added to the two years' course; and they show very clearly that
post-graduate courses are needed. They present much informa-
tion as to methods of instruction, and it appears to me that the
best way to fulfill the present purpose is to lay before you the
questions raised in my mind by this report in connection with my
own as yet brief experience in instruction, in the hope that in the
ensuing discussion the views expressed by others may aid many of
US.
I will therefore ask your attention to the following points:
I. The new phase of law presented by existing American
jurisprudence;- rules suited to the condition of our people.
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II. How far ought law schools to teach procedure?
( i ) Is it practicable?
(2) If taught, should it be before, after, or concurrently-
with substantive law?
III. In respect to special methods of class work:
(i) Where a text book is the basis of instruction, should.
the teacher's exposition precede or follow the reading?
(2) Should students be catechised on what they have
heard and read?
(3) Can written exercises be utilized?
IV. Post-graduate law courses.
I. THE NEW PHASE OF LAW PRESENTED BY EXISTING AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE.
Theories of the proper scope of legal education naturally vary
according to one's habitual conceptions of the law itself.
Many of the profession,-including perhaps now, as doubtless
heretofore, a great majority of instructors in law and of writers
on jurisprudence,- are accustomed to regard law as a fixed sys-
tem of unchangeable principles together with the deductions
which logic dictates in the effort to apply those principles to new
cases or varying circumstances.
This conception is evidently founded on the common law. Its
adherents readily concede that the science of law includes such of
the doctrines of equity as by long recognition have become
hardened into rules, and to some extent imitated and adopted by
the courts exercising jurisdiction at law; but they seem to treat
any movement of equity beyond those rules as an anomalous
interference with law,- a disturbing force from without,-which
must indeed be recognized and allowed for, but is nevertheless
foreign to the fundamental conception of law as a harmonious
system of predetermined uniform rules.
We shall doubtless all agree on the soundness and indeed the
necessity of this conception of law as a part of any just theory of
modern jurisprudence ; and a hundred years ago it was fairly ade-
quate. But I desire, in connection with it, to direct your atten-
tion to the necessity at the present day of recognizing and cobrdi-
nating with it another and very different conception. Let us for
a moment turn away from our books, which are all more or less
modeled or at least influenced by the old conception of law, and
watch the courts of this country to see What they are actually
doing. What is the "law" which we are now administering?
What the method of reasoning that even common law courts are
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really pursuing? Is it simply a system of logic, having inflexible
commands of a superior for its premises, and the inflexible lines
of a syllogism as its deductions? An examination of the current
reports of the decisions of the courts of last resort will show that
while many cases are decided upon that principle a considerable
proportion even of common law cases are decided upon principles
of utility. Our law courts not only use something of the same
freedom in looking for premises in the doctrines of good faith that
courts of equity have always used, but courts of law and courts of
equity alike are now using like freedom in looking for premises
in the present interests of society. Cases are now frequent in
which our courts of last resort are guided in their decision by con-
sidering which of several rules will work the best.
This is not the jurisprudence of a system of commands; it is.
the jurisprudence of common welfare wrought out by free reason-
ing upon the actual facts of life. American jurisprudence as act-
ually administered to-day is the jurisprudence of the Common
Wealth.
In some few matters the law still finds its premises in reverence
for the divine as did ecclesiastical and canon law.
In a large class of matters it finds its premises in the constitu-
tions and statutes, which are in the nature of commands; and upon
all things within their scope we reason as strictly from them as
did the common law which proceeded from premises furnished
by monarchical legislation, and by the equally inflexible usages of
the realni.
But the great mass of the business of our courts, to-day, turns.
upon questions not wholly foreclosed by the history of the past.
The question, what is the traditional law that has come down to.
us, is still asked; but another question is always open, viz., does.
our situation to-day suggest the wisdom of a deviation from that
traditional law?
The key note of this good change was struck when our court
determined that, notwithstanding the unqualified adoption of the
English common law by our constitutions, they would apply and
enforce only so much as is suited to our condition.
From that time forth it has always been, for a court of last
resort, a legitimate enquiry, what rule on the subject under con-
sideration is suitable to the condition of our people; and a legiti-
mate course to disregard common law rules whenever unsuitable,
and to consult the common welfare of the people, as sound premises.
for the decision of any question not foreclosed by statutory
authority.
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Those who have not examined the subject may be surprised to
see how far this principle is now tacitly embodied in our law. I
would characterize the existing American jurisprudence, as suitable
juri.prudence. Historical Jurisprudence shows us how we reached
our present level; Analytic Jurisprudence clears our conceptions
of the various possible rules; Comparative Jurisprudence gives us
breadth of view in comparing them. But existing American Juris-
prudence looks also to the actual situation of affairs. All the
phases of jurisprudence treated in the books are tributary to the
wisdom and caution necessary in working out the development-
now steadily going on whether we recognize it or not-the con-
struction of a Jurisprudence of Utility, a jurisprudence which,
recognizing the unspeakable value of all the traditions of the past,
and respecting the limits of statutory command, seeks also for the
premises to be found in the welfare of the community; and reasons
from them too in ascertaining what principles are suitable to be
received as governing the administration of law among our people.
It would be easy to show that this change in the conception of law
is necessitated by our condition, and that its future advance is
inevitable.
This then I suggest should be, and sooner or later must be,
included within the outline or framework of American legal edu-
cation. To do this we must, as our courts of last resort and our
ablest counsel already do, add to the process of reasoning upon
the technical premises furnished by the common law, broad views
of the sociologic and ethical considerations which ought to con-
trol in a balanced conflict of authority, or an absolutely new ques-
tion. Every department of human knowledge should be laid
under contribution to furnish this new jurisprudence of the
commonwealth,-a jurisprudence which respects the past, but
moves forward according to the requirements of the welfare of
the present and the immediate future.
Unless all signs of the times fail the American system of inde-
pendent legislation in the several States, and an elective judiciary,
and the growing appreciation by the people at large of the science
of public and social economy, are steadily diminishing the area
and relative influence of the common law, bringing into inevitable
disrepute the idea of law as a command, enlarging in every direc-
tion the domain of equity, and raising into its true importance the
judicial recognition of sound reasoning upon the consequences of
a rule, as a safe guide in an ever-increasing class of cases.
I hazard nothing in predicting that American jurisprudence
will soon be recognized as being as far in advance of the common
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law of the books, as a true democratic commonwealth is in
advance of a monarchical government by edict and decree.
Our schools must not therefore exclude or ignore, as some
theories of legal education do, the quality of statesmanship which
is legitimately entering the domain of our law, by the door of
equity, and through the vestibule which the novel conditions of a
new country have formed.
I desire to see founded, in my law school I hope, but at all
events in some conspicuous and influential center, a professorship
of the ethics of jurisprudence, or the sociology of jurisprudence, or
both-the jurisprudence of utility in the broadest sense-suit-
able jurisprudence. I do not mean professional ethics, nor theo-
logical ethics applied to law, nor abstract ethics in any sense. I
mean a chair whose incumbent shall first dissect out and hold up
to view the extent to which our highest courts to-day, in causes
presenting novel questions and questions involving a conflict of
authority, or even old questions on a new situation, are deciding
against authority, upon practical grounds which on analysis are
found to be economic, ethical or sociologic. He should then show
to what extent the efforts of the ablest counsel are already char-
acterized by the appreciation and the discussion of such consider-
ations. He should then develop the principles which should form,
guide and limit such discussions. In other words he should open
the connection between the welfare of the community, and the
actual judicial usages of to-day which permit a reconsideration of
traditional law in view of the needs of the present time. I do not
propose departures from any settled doctrine or application of the
law, nor an innovation of new doctrines. But I put this proposi-
tion: When a question has to be decided on which there is no
adequate authority, or on which a conflict of authority requires
the court to decide which of two rules is to be followed, the bar
are invited to a discussion of the question in view of its -public.
merits. Then is the opportunity for men capable of handling
such open questions in the light of the relative fitness of each rule
to the conditions, usages and needs of our communities, and by the
test of intrinsic justice. And the bar, instead of being discon-
certed or embarrassed by the lack or the uncertainty of authority,
should find in such cases, as many of them already do, a golden
opportunity for their most successful work. We have left far
behind us the common law idea that for the courts of last resort
non-statutory law is in the nature of a command. We have left
far behind us the old conception of equity as merely the chancel-
lor's idea of what is fair in the particular case. Our courts are
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steadily at work in a course which is developing the idea that if
among conflicting rules urged upon them with sanction from the
past they can ascertain which is the most useful to the people in
the judicial sense of utility, that rule should be applied whether
precedents exist or not, or even though precedents forbid. I do
not propose that the law schools should try to accelerate this
development, even if they had the power. If they are to exert
an influence on its progress I incline to think it should be a con-
servative influence. But they cannot long ignore it.
II. How FAR OUGHT LAW SCHOOLS TO TEACH PROCEDURE?
This question whether the schools should teach procedure sug-
gests two distinct points. (i) Is Procedure important as a part of
the science of law? (2) Is it practicable to teach it in schools?
As to its importance :-is it not clear that the great need of the
bench now is a trained bar? Every judge is painfully familiar
with the burden imposed on him in the administration of justice
by a mass of crude and ill digested allegation and proofs thrust
before him by attorneys who may have systematic ideas of the
general principles of the law but are ill trained in the scientific
application of those principles. The reports of our courts of last
resort teem with the wrecks of mispleadings and mistrials.
No greater service could be rendered to the secular interests of
society or to our profession, than to harmonize and unify our
knowledge of procedure, so that wrangles upon practice might be
reduced t6 a minimum, and the time of the courts and bar more
fully given to those noble contests of the forum which serve the
welfare of the world by quieting controversies, removing. causes
of offense, and developing principles and rules of justice and fair
dealing.
How quickly the function of the profession rises to its true
dignity when cases like the Geary law Chinese Registration case,
the Chicago Sunday opening case, the Borden murder case, in the
hands of well trained practitioners move promptly and smoothly
on, each side understanding and respecting the rules of forensic
contest, and devoting their energies to real contention on the
merits. When trained practitioners deal with a cause in such a
manner, sarcasm at lawyers ceases, and the country looks on with
intense interest and undisguised admiration.
What a boon to our community it would be if the practice of
the law could be lifted above the entanglements of half under-
stood procedure, and if a bar trained in the logic of pleading and
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the practice of adducing evidence, and a bench, freed from the
incessant duty of correcting errors in practice, could devote them-
selves fully to the free and useful reasoning of the modern Amer-
ican Law upon the usages of business and the interests of com-
merce and society.
But is the school the place to teach procedure? The old theory
seems to be that the law school is a device to provide such system-
atic learning of substantive law as office training does not afford.
The student was supposed to learn procedure in an office; and,
because the office time was engrossed in procedure, and little time
left for study of principles, the law school was to furnish that part
of legal education which the office wholly neglected. The law
school is considered by many as merely supplementary or prelim-
inary to education in an office.
Of late years I should judge broader views have begun to pre-
vail. It is now seen that procedure is not a trade to be learned
after studying legal principles in a book, any more than surgery
is a trade to be learned after studying anatomy in a book.
Prof. Langdell's courses in Equity Pleading, Prof. Ames'
History of Assumpsit, Prof. Thayer's Development of the Jury,
and other recent lines 'of original instruction show the advance
which has been made. It is now seen that Pleading and Evidence
are the procreative parts of law. Procedure is not "adjective
law." It is verb law. If we wish to see living law, law in motion,
we must see it as procedure develops it. Law is a part of the
science of life. It is in itself a living science. Its subject is life
regulated. If we wish to teach law in its true character as a force
we must show it as it acts. If we wish to teach or to investigate
any principle accurately it is indispensable to take notice of how
it works or is worked in actual application. Modern law subsists
in its application. Its principles when treated as abstractions
may doubtless be classified and catalogued, but they cannot be
adequately appreciated with precision until regarded in their
application.
Against teaching procedure I have heard it objected that law
schools are not established to teach a trade. If this means that
the practice of the law is a trade, we may well challenge the state-
ment. There are already an adequate number of men in the pro-
fession who desire to be great lawyers while they "hate practice."
They who make this the measure of their ambition are about as
wise and successful as soldiers who want to be generals and des-
pise tactics; sailors who want to be admirals and hate navigation.
The practice of the law is the evidence and measure of its useful-
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ness to the community. The "trade" notion stigmatises not the
practitioner but the sordid, mercenary spirit; and whether it be in
the practitioner or the judge, the professor or the author, makes no
difference, except that the higher it goes the worse it is.
But how far is it practicable to teach procedure in the schools ?
On this question I must speak with more reserve; I am seeking
for light upon it. In what I say of procedure let it be understood
that I am not speaking of the mechanical parts of the clerical
function, but of the rules of regularity to be observed in litigation
and the principles and reasons which underlie them all.
My impression is that it will be found easier to teach substan-
tive law and procedure in connection, than to teach substantive
law alone. I do not mean easier for the teacher, but easier for
the learner.
This question connects itself with the more specific topic of
particular methods. Let me consider them together.
I came to the task of legal instruction with no other prepara-
tion than having had a long succession of students in my office,
and having observed their progress and their difficulties. In
endeavoring to assist them, I have found of course that different
minds learn differently; but if my observation is correct, the great
majority of students learn more intelligently, more rapidly, and
more exactly, by dealing first with th6 concrete, and rising
thence to understand the abstract, rather than studying first
the abstract principle and seeking afterward to apply it to con-
crete cases.
To illustrate. At the law school I took up the course as I
found it, and carried the class through the text book on Common
Law Pleading. With all my efforts at clear explanation I found
that at the end of the subject a considerable percentage of the
class had very inadequate conceptions of the count, the verifica-
tion, the similiter, etc., etc. I then printed a pstea taken from
an actual case in our courts, decided just before the abolition of
common law forms, and distributed copies among the class, as an
illustration of all the elements in the process they had been study-
ing. It was of great advantage in clearing up the misconceptions
which the course had left. The next year I commenced my
course with that same paper; and after a brief introductory expo-
sition of the reason why pleadings are used, and of the general
course of pleading in a common law suit, I distributed the postea,
and required one student after another to rise, read aloud each a
single sentence, and give in the fewest possible wordy his idea of
the fact that sentence brought into the case, or the legal function
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it performed, in that extended dialogue on paper which we term
the pleadings. The students were thus required to handle the
thing itself, not as an illustration of what we had studied, but as a
preparation for study. As we went on I printed sixteen declara-
tions, each appropriate to one of the most important actions in
American common law practice. I found that this method of
putting the thing to be studied into the hands of the student to
be studied in advance, awakened interest, induced what I may
call vivid thinking, and enabled them to form cliar conceptions
of the abstract principles they were endeavoring to apprehend.
And this addition to the course, instead of lengthening it, actually
accelerated our progress, shortened the time needed, and secured
a clear-headed understanding of the subject in a far larger pro-
portion of the class than when I gave first the principles and then
the actual case as an after illustration.
I pursued the same method with equity pleading; a long bill
with answer and replication taken from the records of our old
Court of Chancery in its later years, was our first introduction to
that subject; and the first lesson consisted in analyzing the bill in
class as a careful solicitor would do, writing in the margin oppo-
site each paragraph the key words or gist of that portion of the
bill as suggested by members of the class and corrected if neces-
safy by me. In doing that the mysteries of the "narrative part,"
the " charging part," the " jurisdiction clause," etc., etc., became
clear to them all; and the way was prepared for studying intelli-
gently the principles of pleading in equity.
In the same manner I have treated code pleading by prefixing
to the cases in pleading given out to be read by the class the
very pleading under discussion by the court; and in each case
where the pleading was held faulty, a part of the exercise is to
correct it.
The effect of printing the actual pleading which was drawn in
question, and the various views of it taken first by the court of
first instance, and then on the intermediate appeal, and lastly by
the court of last resort, has been to awaken in the class the most
lively interest in the question. They have been able to handle,
so to speak the very weapons of contention, to enter into the pro-
fessional controversy intelligently; they have found out the legal
significance of the language used, and the value of clear-headed
thinking and accurate expression. And with the actual pleading
before us, the mode of varying the legal effect by amendment, has
shown clearly the scope of each cause of action, and the elements
involved in it, and in kindred or slightly different causes.
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I have found the same principle applicable to other studies.
The difficulties of the Statute of Frauds are prepared for by putting
a copy of the statute into the hands of every student in the class-
room, and a collection of short -contracts of each class, some com-
plying with the statute, some obnoxious to it, and some on or near
the line. So with deeds or declarations of trust; with mortgages;
with assumption clauses; with guaranties; equitable conversion;
and the rule that oral evidence is not admissible to vary a writing.
Hardly any subject have I touched that I have not found clear
thinking, and ability to grasp legal conceptions and master prin-
ciples greatly promoted by dealing first with the thing' itself as a
preparation for the abstract propositions of substantive law.
This way of requiring students to deal with legal instruments
of various kinds in connection with their study of generalprinciples
or of particular cases, affords another great advantage, namely, the
training it incidentally gives in clearness and precision in the use
of legal language.
More than one-half the litigations of to-day involve controver-
sies about the use of language.
A& large part of the unnecessary contests about procedure which
afflict our courts, results from lack of clear expression in the plead-
ings and proceedings of the attorneys, and from that vagueness
and inexactness of thought which always accompanies the habit-
ual use of obscure and indefinite language. And contests on the
merits which involve no questions of procedure very often turn on
similar inexactness or ambiguity in the legal instruments which
attorneys draw. If the student is trained in general principles by
the aid of actual instruments, he gains incidentally a sense of the
importance of clearness and an ability to secure it for himself
which is invaluable to him, and to the court whose officer he is.
"The power of clear statement" said Daniel Webster "is the
great power at the bar."
It appears to me therefore that the principles of law and equity
can most usefully be taught with the aid of actual instances of
application, used not so much as after-illustrations, but as present-
ing facts which enable the student to form a vivid and accurate con-
ception of the problem, and to deal with the actualities as the
materials for generalization. If I am not mistaken the great
source of error in our attempts to state substantive law is too
broad generalization. The student should be taught not merely
the generalization, as in text books, nor merely the process and
results of reasoning upon it, as in case-law studies; he should also
be provided with the materials for forming a vivid conception of
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those things from comparing which the principle is drawn, and to
the regulation of which the principle is to be applied.
When I first tried this method the former Dean of our school
said that "it was like a demonstration in anatomy, we had the
cadaver upon the table, and there was no misunderstanding the
principle explained by its dissection."
This gave me encouragement, for it suggested that I was only
conforming to the general advance made in other departments of
education; and on inquiry I found that the most characteristic
feature of the improved methods of teaching other branches of
science is the sending of the student, the very first thing, into the
laboratory. He who is to understand intelligently the results of
spectrum analysis must as a part of his preparation, handle the
spectroscope and scan the spectrum of various substances. He
who is to grasp adequately the conceptions which a study of the
principles of astronomy or electricity requires, needs to handle the
instruments of precision as a part of his introduction. The time
spent on this handling of things is not time added but time saved
to the course, by reason of the better power it gives the mind.
The old method of education is for the teacher to communicate
the results of his own studies, and his scholars learn them as the
beginning of theirs. The modern method is to prepare theni for
beginning where he left off by leading them through some of the
paths which be or other investigators pursued to reach that eleva-
tion. The old method is the more natural and easier for the
teacher; for he who by a long course of labor has mastered the
general principles of his science, looks upon those principles as his
attainments, and upon the long course of labor as the obstacle, the
hindrance. He values the results only, and in teaching he natu-
rally begins by communicating those results. But if he is really
a master of his subject, his mastery is in part due to the labor with
actual details by which he reached h{s results. It is now seen,
in other sciences at least, that to expect his students to begin
where he ended, is to expect them to acquire his attainments with-
out getting his ability.
The modem method is to lead the pupil through a specimen
path of investigation; to give him a well chosen problem, point
him to the factors by which to solve it, require him to experience
the doubts, the anticipations, and the final victory of actual inves-
tigation; and when he has thus learned the path by which all
science is pursued he is ready to appreciate the significance of the'
results of other investigations which he has no need to pursue.
Then and not till then is he ready to grasp and utilize the wealth
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of results which his teacher has acquired by labor and by inherit-
ance from the labors of others. When he himself has labored at
something, as other men have labored at many things, and by the
process has found the meaning of the results of his own work,
then he has become qualified to apprehend the results of others'
work without repeating their processes.
I believe the law is a true science, and to be scientifically
taught. To confine teaching to the communication of results, is
to confine most students to memorizing formulas. The student
should labor himself in order to be able to enter into other men's
labors.
Assuming then that some of you at least, agree with me in the
importance of what for the want of a better expression I may call
laboratory work in studying law, I would ask, Should such study
of procedure as a school affords be postponed till after the coni-
pletion of courses in substantive law? Or should some parts of
it at least precede that or be concurrent, and if so, what parts?
III. SPECIFIC METHODS OF CLASS WORK.
In respect to the methods of instruction, I assume that the
result of the controversy between the advocates of the Dwight
method and the Case method allows me to say that the opinion
now prevalent is that there is no one best way of teaching law,
any more than there is one best way of trying a case. A case in
equity is not to be tried like a case at law. A negligence case is
not to be tried like a seal fisheries arbitration case. Rufus
Choate is not to try cases like Daniel Webster. And go with
methods of instruction. I say therefore to my colleagues, use
your own judgment.' Get what light you can from the methods
and opinions of others, study the minds of your students, consider
the nature of your subject, and then use your own personality
in your own way, with freedom, force and vivacity, to secure in
the class as much unbroken attention and as much vivid thinking
as you can.
There are some other questions as to method on which I much
desire to hear opinions from some of those present, and I believe
most of you share the desire.
(i) Where a text book is the basis of instruction should the instructor's
exposition precede or follow the reading ?
I understand several methods are in use. Some teachers
lecture on the topic of the lesson first, then the lesson is read out
of class; and next day the students are examined on the ground.
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covered. Others require the lesson in the text-book to be first
read out of class, and then the same ground is gone over in class,
with illustrations, explanations, corrections and enlargements,
interspersed with questions to the class. In my limited experi-
ence I have thus far found the best results by first briefly explain-
ing the controversies among men which raise the questions treated
of in the text, putting a few real or supposed cases as problems
for treatment according to the principles given in the text-book,
then giving out the text to be read out of class, and the next day
I supplement the text-book by explanations bringing it down
to date so to speak, lastly dictating a very concise skeleton or
aide memoire of those rules on the subject which are upper-
most in American jurisprudence to-day, with mention of a strong
leading case for each rule. This finishes the subject; and is
followed in turn by preliminary explanation of the kind of
controversies to be settled by the rules and principles of the
next lesson. This method surveys the same ground three
times, each in a different way. But it takes time; and the dicta-
tion is necessarily slow.
In some schools I understand the students instead of taking
notes are furnished with type-written notes. I think a compari-
son of views among those here on the relation of lecture, text-
book, and note books, and the best combination of them, would
be interesting. It certainly would be instructive and helpful to
me.
(2) Should students be catechised on what they have heard and read?
It is well understood now in all educational processes that
reading and hearing is not enough to give students the mastery of
a subject. The eye is one channel into the mind, so to speak; the
ear is another. But neither "carries" through the mind. To
enlist the whole mind, an effort at expression is needed. Aca-
demic recitations, if used at all in a professional school, have their
real value in adding to the hearing and reading, the effort of the
mind to formulate results, to reproduce as its own, the knowl-
edge introduced. This completes the circuit. But is there no
better way?
The "colloquy," introduced by the Case system is admirable.
One of the chief values of the Case system appears to me that it
puts the student at once on professional methods of study, instead
of academic. When two or three of us lawyers meet in practice,
as counsel, to confer on the merits of a doubtful action or defense,
we get down four or five recent or leading cases and examine them
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together, and a colloquy ensues which brings out an analysis of
each case, and in that way we reach consentaneous views As to
what the law is on the point. This is substantially the natural
course with the 'Case system. Is this form of discussion feasible
with the text book system? It appears to me that in a professional
school we should adopt as far as practicable professional methods
of study, rather than academic methods. But professional methods
make large use of text-books.
( 3) Written Exercises.
Is there not some feasible use of writing as an effort at expres-
sion short of the ponderous and often pretentious essays and
theses that are now almost the sole mode of writing proposed to
the student? Every lawyer knows the truth of Bacon's apothegm
that reading makes a full man, speaking makes a ready man, and
writing makes an exact man. Legal training should of all things
include exactness.
The only advance that I have, made in this direction is the
Written Quiz. Half sheets of paper are distributed through the
class and questions are put calling for concise statements of four
or five legal principles or rules, which have been explained. In
fifteen minutes, two-thirds of the class have handed in their
answers. As the answers are handed up I can examine them, and
they disclose to me the typical misapprehensions and deficiencies
which my exposition has left in the minds of the class. - An error
which occurs only in one or two of the papers may, if time is short,
be passed over as idiosyncratic; but substantially the same error
is always found occurring in various forms in many papers.
These errors can be then concisely explained reading one aloud as
a basis of comment. Blunders remain anonymous, and one cor-
rection is a scattering shot that hits many birds. Another peculiar
value of this exercise is that it discloses tome the inadequacy of my
previous exposition. Where a large number of students of vary-
ing degrees of ability fail on the same point I cannot attribute it
wholly to dullness or inattention on their part.
Are there not other and perhaps better methods of requiring
students to make some systematic and frequent efforts at accurate
expression of the results of their studies?
IV. PosT GRADUATE COURSES.
If the views I have expressed of the new phase of law pre-
sented by our existing jurisprudence which requires the courts in
case of doubt to ask what rule is best suited to our condition, are
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just, the importance and the ultimate necessity of post graduate
courses of the highest grade becomes more clear. In organizing
such courses we have in part to create the appetite which we aim
to supply. In passing through the undergraduate studies we
should lose no fit opportunity of pointing the students to the con-
nected topics of scientific jurisprudence, and their relationito the
subject in hand. In learning private and technical law they should
learn that it is incomplete and not workable to the highest advan-
tage without its broader relations with universal law. As we lead
the class along the ordinary galleries of every-day law, therefore,
we should not forget to call their attention to the doors on this
hand and that, which open into the inner halls of learning, and if
possible give them a glimpse within each as we pass, that they
may be the more inclined to return another year and explore the
treasures of which they have as yet n6 adequate idea.
I have mentioned the principal questions that have presented
themselves to my mind as I have read and re-read the comprehen-
sive and admirable report of the Committee on Legal Education
and reviewed in its light my brief experience of the past two
years. I for one feel greatly indebted to the committee for the
aid their labors afford. And I have come with a strong desire- to
hear a free interchange of opinions in regard to methods.
It is clear that one great danger to our beloved country is the
lack of respect for law which is shown in so many ways, from
social laxity, and commercial and political frauds down to uncon-
cealed anarchy. The safety of our future is bound up with the
supremacy of justice as administered by a judiciary now for the
most part elective. The bench cannot be expected to maintain
the public respect for law unless aided by a trained bar, and it is
only a trained bar that can supply fit candidates for the bench,
the legislature and the chief executive and administrative offices.
Legal education is thus an indispensable condition of our
national welfare; and none of us can better discharge the debt
which he owes to his profession than by seconding the efforts in
which this committee are so ably leading.
The questions I have .been led to ask all point to one under-
lying question,viz., should not legal education aim at the devel-
opment of the man in the student, quite as much as at the com-
munication of rules of law? Is it not easier to do both together,
than to do one alone? Is there any better training for the mind
than legal science; and, at the same time, is there any better aid
in learning the principles of that science than the best develop-
ment of mental powers?
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What then are the methods of instruction in law which the
experience of those here have found most useful in securing on




4. Clear expression, and
5. An appreciation of law, as being (subject only to statutory
limitations) the application of a divine ideal of justice to the act-
ual affairs of life?
Austin Abbott.
